


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


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1. JORDAN SITUATION DISPLAYS SIGNS OF
CONTINUED INSTABILITY

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King Hussain's dismissal of General Glubb has intensified the instability in Jordan. Jordanian prime minister Rifai virtually admitted to US ambassador Mallory his government's fear of prompt British counteraction, such as withdrawal of all British officers in the Arab Legion and termination of the British subsidy. Both of these moves are under discussion in London. The impression left by the Foreign Office on Ambassador Aldrich is that Britain considers its position in Jordan irretrievably lost.

Reports from Amman and elsewhere strongly suggest that King Hussain is under the domination of a group of young Jordanian officers of the Arab Legion called the Free Officers Movement, which seems to be similar to the Revolutionary Command in Egypt. The British believe disintegration of the Arab Legion is likely, and the young officer group might then resort to drastic moves, including even removal of the king, to retain its position. Further unrest and political agitation are likely to develop in Palestinian West Jordan, where Communist elements are active.

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2. COMMUNISTS MAY BACK MOLLET GOVERNMENT ON ALGERIA

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The French Communist Party (PCF) is seriously considering supporting Premier Mollet in the National Assembly vote on special powers for Algeria,

according to a member of President Coty's staff. The acting secretary general of the Socialist Party believes that the Communists may at least abstain. He comments that the current PCF line stressing "ties between France and Algeria" is an amazing change probably linked with the recent return of Communist leaders from Moscow.

The US embassy believes Mollet's chances are very favorable for winning the vote, which is expected by 13 March.

Comment

Communist support of Mollet for a strong policy in Algeria would indicate the party's determination to use every device to achieve a popular front.

In an effort to get widespread support on this issue, Mollet has been consulting with party leaders from the Communists to the Poujadists. None of the major nongovernment parties has committed itself. However, it is believed that the right-center would be unwilling to bring down the government now, particularly since the government's Algerian policy is much more to its liking than seemed possible when Mollet assumed office. In the event of Communist support, the right-center can also be expected to back the government in an effort to avoid the appearance of a popular front.

3. AMBASSADOR BOHLEN'S OBSERVATIONS ON SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS

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[REDACTED] Ambassador Bohlen stresses that the Soviet 20th Party Congress did not inaugurate a new phase in Soviet development but merely confirmed and "legalized" the main lines of policies which have been developing since Stalin's death.

The ambassador believes that the ideological readjustments set forth by the congress were necessary because Stalinist ideology based on "the cult of personality" could not serve as a foundation for the more flexible and realistic policies which collective leadership has permitted. Ideological adjustments were also necessary in order to take cognizance of the changed relationships between the Soviet Union and other members of the Communist bloc, as well as to bolster up new relationships with Yugoslavia. These adjustments may also reflect diminished Soviet need for Communist parties in non-Soviet countries, a logical corollary of increased Soviet confidence in the strength and international position of the USSR. The new ideological developments also confirm the view that ideology is the servant of the Soviet state and not, except in broadest outline, its master.

Bohlen notes that by laying down formidable political and psychological barriers to the resumption of one-man rule, the congress has made it more difficult for Khrushchev or any other leader to become a second Stalin. He adds that collective leadership implies the continuing possibility of discord among its members, which might lead to its breakdown. He believes, however, that such a development would be unlikely except during an emergency or crisis, signs of which are not visible, or from an unbridgeable difference of opinion on current policy. Agriculture remains

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the most likely source of dispute, particularly in the event of failure this year of Khrushchev's new-lands and corn projects.

Bohlen concludes that the changes since Stalin's death have not resulted in any improvement of the Soviet moral position. The cynicism of the regime is well illustrated by the spectacle of the leaders at the congress, every one a creature of Stalin and involved up to the hilt in all his actions, now turning on him without a single dissenting voice.

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
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6. IMPENDING AMERICAN NUCLEAR TESTS AROUSING FUROR IN JAPAN

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The announcement on 2 March of the danger zone for the forthcoming American nuclear tests in the Pacific has provoked sharp press and popular criticism in Japan, Ambassador Allison reports.

Allison notes that the Japanese government recognizes that the tests cannot be suspended, and



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that safety measures are adequate. Tokyo's principal aim is to secure compensation for the fish usually caught in the

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danger zone, for the cost of detouring around the zone, and for the expenses incurred in checking the radioactivity of the fish subsequently caught in the affected area.

Comment A recent Japanese public opinion survey stated that 60 percent of the people interviewed believed atomic energy is more of a curse than a boon and would favor a ban on nuclear armaments, even if the USSR had superiority in conventional weapons.

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8. VIET MINH WEAKNESS IN CENTRAL VIETNAM DESCRIBED

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[REDACTED] Viet Minh influence in Central Vietnam (Annam) has declined greatly in recent months, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] President Diem's strongly nationalist stand has deprived the Viet Minh of its basic point of appeal--opposition to the French--and his anti-Viet Minh propaganda program has given additional momentum to the significant pro-Diem swing.

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The Viet Minh elements in Central Vietnam have no aggressive potential except for isolated acts of terrorism, [REDACTED]

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
Comment

The regrouping of military forces in accordance with the Geneva truce gave most of Central Vietnam its first freedom from Viet Minh rule in eight years. Although the Viet Minh left behind a well-developed apparatus, basic popular hostility to the Viet Minh has operated strongly in Diem's favor. Diem's appeal in Central Vietnam is also enhanced by his family's close ties there.

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9. USSR REPORTEDLY HAS OFFERED "FREE GIFT" OF AID TO LIBYA



Libyan prime minister Ben Halim told Ambassador Lodge during his visit to Tripoli in late February that the Soviet Union had offered Libya a "free gift" of economic aid

as a token of Soviet good will. The offer reportedly includes a large quantity of wheat as well as bitumen and cement for road building, heavy agricultural machinery from Czechoslovakia, equipment for hospitals and schools, and medical supplies.

Ben Halim stated that the offer was made with "no strings attached" except for a request that a TASS correspondent be admitted to Libya.

Comment

This is the most specific information yet received on a Soviet gift offer to Libya.

Ben Halim has previously used Soviet offers to exert pressure for additional American assistance. The size of the offer, if correctly reported, underlines Soviet determination to outbid the West for Libyan favor. (Concurred in by ORR)

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 7 March)

An Israeli military spokesman reported an exchange of shooting between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Gaza area. Israel claims an Egyptian military position in the Gaza strip opened fire on an Israeli outpost. Egypt has protested to the Mixed Armistice Commission over five flights made by Israeli planes on 6 March over the northern part of the Gaza strip.

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The American military attaché in Tel Aviv reports that the 11th Armored Infantry Brigade is currently at full strength, "beautifully equipped," in first-class condition, and on stand-by at Camp Sarafand at Tel Aviv. The brigade could "roll" on a moment's notice.

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The Israeli press is pointing up the increased danger of war as a result of General Glubb's dismissal from the Arab Legion. The semiofficial newspaper writes that the "threat to Israel, with Glubb's departure, has increased ominously." Israel is planning to make its most extensive civil defense test early next week in Haifa. Civilians as well as military units will participate in the test.

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The American military attaché in Jordan anticipates an increase in border incidents along the Israeli-Jordanian border as a result of Glubb's dismissal. He believes that lack of restraint and mature judgment under Jordanian leadership along the border could precipitate war. The attaché based his belief on a report that Arab Legion troops under a Jordanian commander had fired on Israeli boats as they withdrew from Syrian fire.

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The American military attaché in Damascus reports that the chief German adviser to the Syrian army fears

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the danger of hostilities because of the absence of the Syrian
chief of staff in Cairo and the chance that it gives "young offi-
cers" to make a "mistake."

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